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Huge numbers of Muslim demonstrators poured in from neighbouring regions. Though oficially dissolved, it remained active for most of the New Order period. Mapping Radical Islam: Most of these groups were ephemeral, emerging and dissolving in response to speciic events in Indonesia or the world outside the civil war in the Moluccas, the American attack of Iraq. Yayasan Obor Indonesia,
A related argument is that political democratization has drawn many of those who were previously involved in organizations or institutions supporting intellectual debate towards careers in political parties or institutions, thereby weakening the social basis of liberal and progressive Islamic discourse.
The high visibility of Indonesian Arabs holding leading positions in radical movements seemed to point to their role as middlemen in a process of Arabization of Indonesian Islam. The increased presence of Arab actors and Arab funding is undeniable, but, as I have argued elsewhere, their inluence does not exclusively work in an anti-liberal or fundamentalist direction.
It is too early to say whether the slide of the latter organizations towards more conservative views was temporary; my observations at the most recent NU congress in March suggest that the anti-liberal trend has subsided and may even be reversed Bruinessen In order to place these developments in a broader social and historical context, these chapters are preceded by a broad overview of Indonesian Muslim organizations and movements. One important function of the Council has been, from the start, the issuance of fatwa authoritative opinions on matters of religious importance and counsels tausiah to the government as well as the public.
The members of the Council were chosen by the government to relect the various strands of mainstream Islam; although most were afiliated with one Muslim association or another, they did not represent these associations but were accountable to the government only.
There was no place for regime critics in the Council, but at least some members believed they could through the Council persuade the government to carry out an Islamic agenda.
When the elections brought the Habibie regime to an end, the MUI began distancing itself from the government neither Abdurrahman Wahid nor Megawati Sukarnoputri were sympathetic to it.
It restyled itself as a civil society institution — without, however, giving up the inancial contributions from the government. Like all large voluntary associations, the Council organized national conferences and congresses the irst congresses in and , where the national leadership was elected and major policy decisions taken. Membership, and participation in the congresses, however, appear to be based on co-optation. The Council expanded its membership, that originally consisted of New Order supporters, with persons of Islamist persuasion, including activists of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.
No liberal Muslims were admitted, nor Shiah or Ahmadiyah Muslims. The MUI remained formally a deliberative council but was intent on more active participation in the political process.
Backed up by an FUI demonstration, the Council played a part in drafting the law on national education and ensuring Muslim demands were met. In this case, the success was limited and the legislation appears stalled indeinitely. Although both caused considerable opposition from prominent individuals and several of these put the legitimacy of the MUI into doubt, the opposition never managed to unite itself into an organized force and remained ineffective.
The Muhammadiyah, studied here by Ahmad Najib Burhani, is one of the oldest Muslim associations and the second largest after the Nahdlatul Ulama. The Muhammadiyah has established a vast network of schools all over the country, and a dozen universities, as well as hospitals and orphanages. Unlike the NU, the Muhammadiyah can pride itself in an enormous pool of highly educated members who are employed in all modern sectors of society.
A very high proportion of Muhammadiyah members, however, including virtually all members of the board, appear to be civil servants — many of them university teachers. This caused a backlash and a temporary reversal, as the organization veered to the right.
Like other large associations, the Muhammadiyah has five-yearly congresses, where a new board is elected and major policy decisions are taken. It is important to realize that decisions at the congress are taken by majority vote by the delegates, who represent local branches and are close to the grassroots.
There has therefore often been a disjunction between the discourse of leading thinkers and the decisions of the congresses. Hermeneutics replaced Islamic legal thought as the dominant mode of discourse. Dialogue with other religions received more emphasis, as well as a more positive appreciation of local culture and art, to which the Muhammadiyah had always had an ambivalent attitude.
The new chairman, Din Syamsuddin, was widely seen as embodying the conservative backlash. He had in previous years acquired the image of a hardliner, often speaking out against the West on behalf of embattled Muslims. As the secretary general of the MUI he had made his mark as a spokesman for conservative causes, in defence of radical movements, and against the rights of religious minorities.
Signiicantly, he has been patronizing some prominent young progressives and as the chairman has kept the Muhammadiyah on a middle course. A case in point was the recent threat to the very identity of the Muhammadiyah from the side of radical Muslim groups, notably the Tarbiyah movement out of which the political party PKS emerged. In the last few years, both the NU and Muhammadiyah discovered that they were vulnerable to iniltration and takeover of assets by radical Islamist movements that to some extent shared their discourse.
In the case of the NU, this was especially the Hizb ut-Tahrir, several of whose leading activists have a NU family and educational background; in Muhammadiyah, Tarbiyah activists appeared most successful. Several mosques that had been the bases of local Muhammadiyah or NU communities were gradually taken over by members of one of the radical movements, who created an entirely different atmosphere and monopolized the pulpit for their own preachers.
More seriously, a Muhammadiyah school was taken over by Tarbiyah activists, who changed the curriculum and renamed the school. These incidents caused grave concern among committed Muhammadiyah members. There are in fact numerous people who are members of both the Muhammadiyah and the PKS.
Perceiving that this could cause conlicts of loyalty, the Tanwir ended with a decision demanding strict loyalty to the organization from its members, especially those employed at Muhammadiyah-owned institutions. The demand of unambiguous loyalty, incidentally, was not only meant to counter the threat of iniltration and takeover by the PKS or other radical movements, but also that of tying the Muhammadiyah to any speciic political party, and more speciically the efforts of some young people to establish a Muhammadiyah-based political party, PMB.
It does not mean, however, that the position of the progressives has improved; they remain marginalized within the organization. Along with West Java and Aceh, South Sulawesi had been, between and , one of the regional bases of the Darul Islam rebellion, with which several later radical movements appear to have had historical connections.
Unlike its West Javanese counterpart, it had strongly opposed syncretistic religious practices as well as Suism, and it had also been oppressive towards the signiicant Christian minority in the province. This had limited the popularity of the movement even among pious Muslims. Many leading personalities preferred to accommodate themselves with the government, and both traditionalists and reformist Muslims massively joined Golkar during the New Order, turning this political machine into a vehicle for representing regional as well as personal career interests.
South Sulawesi became the province where Golkar received the highest percentage of votes. Two famous and successful sons of the region, B. Habibie and Jusuf Kalla, established strong patronage networks in the worlds of education and trade, and helped strengthen the voice of the province at the centre. One important network is that of the pesantren Hidayatullah, established in Balikpapan East Kalimantan in the early s by an adjutant of Kahar Muzakkar.
It became the centre of a nationwide network of pesantren most of them linked with the Bugis diaspora of an internationalist Islamist orientation and published a journal, Suara Hidayatullah, that took up major international issues from an Islamist standpoint and after the fall of Soeharto openly supported radical movements. The KPPSI grew out of a broad coalition of Muslim groups of different ideological persuasion, similar to such committees set up elsewhere in the country, the Front Umat Islam.
A paramilitary group, Jundullah, that had earlier been established by people from South Sulawesi in Solo, joined the KPPSI as its military arm, strengthening the perception that this was just a reincarnation of the Darul Islam. The arrest of several members of Jundullah in connection with bombings in Makassar in damaged the reputation of the KPPSI in the public eye.
The KPPSI was vocal in its demand of the enforcement of Shariah in the province but not very explicit about what this should mean nor very successful in achieving even symbolic successes. Politicians, up to the provincial governor, paid some lip service to the idea of enacting regional Shariah legislation but since a broad range of public personalities with solid Islamic credentials opposed it, the issue was shelved — except in the district of Bulukumba, in the southernmost part of the province.
Signiicantly, this bupati was a Golkar politician and had no connections with the KPPSI but believed the regulations would be popular with his constituency. The KPPSI has an ambivalent attitude towards democracy — it does not think highly of a system in which a majority vote carries more weight than the divine command — but its members do take part in elections, and several were elected into the provincial parliament.
His poor showing in the contest just over 20 per cent of the vote indicated that the people of the province have other priorities than the formalization of the Shariah. Yet there has not even been an attempt to have local Shariah regulations enacted here.
This paradox is easily explained: The city has sizable Chinese and Arab communities, both involved in trade and still strongly concentrated in distinct neighbourhoods, Jebres and Pasar Kliwon, respectively.
Two other neighbourhoods are known as concentrations of Javanese pious Muslims, the Kauman next to the court mosque, where court and mosque oficials live, and Laweyan, home to Javanese small entrepreneurs, mostly 01 CDII.
The other neighbourhoods are predominantly abangan. Contrary to the widely held view that opposes the syncretistic culture of the Javanese courts to scriptural Islam, the irst institutions of Islamic education in Solo were established at the initiative of the court. Surprisingly, neither the Muhammadiyah nor the NU had much inluence here until much later, and these associations that dominate Islamic education elsewhere in Java have remained rather weak in Solo.
It was only during the New Order period that it received serious competitors. The DDII was established by former Masyumi politicians who were no longer allowed to participate actively in politics and who saw dakwah, Islamic propagation, as the most needed and appropriate method of changing social norms and social behaviour. Strongly supported by the national leadership, the Central Javanese branch based in Solo established an Islamic radio station, an Islamic hospital, and a pesantren dedicated to training committed preachers for carrying out the dakwah mission.
The pesantren, Al-Mukmin, later became widely known by the name of the village where it moved after a few years, Ngruki.
Increasingly inluenced by the ideas and strategies of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, he joined the underground Darul Islam network when this was being revived and used the pesantren for recruiting committed cadres of an Islamic movement. The recruits were trained in small groups usrah that constituted cells of a clandestine movement.
Much of the usrah network remained in place, however, and several 01 CDII. In a major clash between the two factions in , some of the radical teachers were expelled from Ngruki and established a new pesantren or joined an existing one in the Solo region. Possibly the conlict in Ngruki was also related to another rupture that emerged around the same time.
In Malaysia Sungkar had come increasingly under the inluence of global Salai jihadism. After a clash with Masduki, the leader of the branch of the Darul Islam NII to which he adhered, Sungkar broke away and set himself up as the amir commander of his own network, henceforth known as Jamaah Islamiyah. Both appear to have been present in Ngruki, but NII predominated. For understandable reasons, Ngruki has received a lot of attention, but it is not the most inluential dakwah initiative of the early New Order.
Adapting its style to local culture and speciically addressing abangan audiences while spreading a message critical of that culture and worldview, this movement reaches a much wider public than any other. Its constituency is mostly the social and geographical periphery of Solo; no Arabs are active in it, and only a small number of university educated people.
In the irst years after the demise of the New Order, Solo witnessed the emergence of a large number of Islamic vigilante groups, similar to those in the Jakarta region but larger in number and even more active.
Most of these groups were ephemeral, emerging and dissolving in response to speciic events in Indonesia or the world outside the civil war in the Moluccas, the American attack of Iraq. Besides the occasional anti- 01 CDII.
One is tempted to say that they did not waste energy on demanding local Shariah regulations but directly imposed their own version of Shariah rule instead. This is a rather closed community or sect, whose members distinguish themselves by dress style similar to that of the Salais but who have no relation to the broader Salai movement.
There has been a general shift in religious orientation towards Salaism, the extremely puritan brand of Islam that is the oficial doctrine in Saudi Arabia, which appears to have affected almost all radical movements and organizations in Solo. There seems to be a paradox in the fact that the Salai movement is making its advances especially in parts of the country where syncretistic varieties of Islam, the opposite extreme to Salaism, are predominant, such as Solo.
Salaism appears to be attractive precisely to people of abangan background because it is simple and rigid, and has clear rules; its transnational character gives it the additional attraction of cosmopolitanism. More generally, one may conclude that radical movements were relatively successful in Solo because the large national mainstream Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU were only marginally present there.
In spite of their relative successes, however, the radical movements remained minorities among a majority that still holds strongly to abangan views and values. The founders of the Liberal Islam Network JIL adopted this name from an inluential anthology of texts by modern Muslim thinkers that represented a broad range of intellectual positions Kurzman They have also defended political and economic liberalism, which some of them see as inseparable from religious liberalism.
Conservatives notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges to established authority, as well as to modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture. There are conservatives among traditionalist as well as reformist Muslims i. They obviously share some views with most conservatives, such as the rejection of hermeneutics and of rights-based discourses, but may clash with conservatives over established practices lacking strong scriptural foundations.
On the role in these massacres of a major Muslim youth organization, afiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, see Bruinessen The fatwa clearly targeted, however, various groups that adhered to less radical views of liberalism and pluralism and that will be discussed below. Signiicantly, the MUI made no statement condemning the violence against Ahmadiyah members and appeared to consider the Ahmadiyah as the offending party.
See Crouch A collection of articles by one of the contributors to that volume, Ebrahim Moosa, were published in Indonesian translation by the Jakarta-based Center for Islam and Pluralism; see Moosa Studia Islamika 4, no. Barton, Gregory James. Monash University, In Indonesien am Ende des Jahrhunderts, edited by Ingrid Wessel. Abera-Verlag, In Indonesia in Transition: Pustaka Pelajar, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed. Brill, Inside Indonesia , July—September Working paper. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Bush, Robin.
Anomaly or Symptom? Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Cribb, Robert, ed. The Indonesian Killings — Studies from Java and Bali. Crouch, Melissa. Gillespie, Piers. Journal of Islamic Studies 18, no. Hasan, Noorhaidi. Laskar Jihad: Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Klinken, Gerry van. Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars.
Routledge, Kurzman, Charles, ed. Liberal Islam: A Source Book. New York: Oxford University Press, Translated into Indonesian as Wacana Islam Liberal. Paramadina, Moosa, Ebrahim. Islam Progresif: William Liddle. Journal of Democracy 15, no. Feeling Threatened: Amsterdam University Press, Sai, Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oneworld, The two largest Muslim associations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama NU , which have long dominated Muslim social life and educational activities in Indonesia, are probably the largest and most complex organizations of the entire Muslim world.
Those expressing a strong identiication with these associations amounted to 4 and 17 per cent, which would amount to 9 and 38 million followers, respectively Mujani and Liddle Card-carrying, dues-paying membership is no doubt considerably lower, but these two associations have reached a degree of societal penetration that is unparalleled in the Muslim world. The organizations provide a wide range of services to their constituencies, from education, health care and charity to answering religious questions and determining beginning and end of the fasting month.
The Muhammadiyah and NU are the most conspicuous, though by no means the only representatives of these two streams. This includes especially relations with the spirit world, intercession by saints, and various forms of magic.
Most contemporary reformists, however, are wary of too much rationalism and contextualization, and one aspect of the developments discussed in this volume is the shift away from rationalistic modernism to more literal readings of scripture and puritanical reform.
They tend to be tolerant of the incorporation of local cultural forms of expression in their religious life. The scholars of Islam, ulama, are highly respected, and it is considered better to follow great ulama of the past rather than reason independently. The favourite form of education is the pesantren curriculum, in which the study of classical Arabic texts, with a strong emphasis on iqh, Islamic jurisprudence, is central. The ierce competition between the major political parties of those years made this division appear as more pervasive and meaningful than it probably was in daily life: After the highly politicized Sukarno years, the New Order was a period of depoliticization and economic growth.
Muhammadiyah schools teach primarily modern subjects; religious instruction takes only a modest place and uses Indonesian textbooks, no Arabic texts.
Within the Muhammadiyah, the regions of Yogyakarta and West Sumatra have long been seen as competing poles, representing different styles of reformism. West Sumatra had a strong reformist tradition even before the emergence of the Muhammadiyah, and the Sumatran Muhammadiyah branches have tended to be more puritan i. After independence, the Muhammadiyah became increasingly an association of Muslim civil servants, and presently the organization is pervaded by a civil servant ethos.
The Muhammadiyah is strongly represented in the higher echelons of the Ministry of Education, and in the post-Soeharto period it has successfully attempted to gain control of the Ministry and have its views on education enshrined in legislation. All three are reformist in religious doctrine in the sense of rejecting beliefs and practices that were not present in original Islam as well in method of education.
Besides, there are a number of reformist associations of regional importance, about which more below. Al Irsyad was to remain an ethnic association of exclusively non-sayyid Arabs, strongly inluenced by Egyptian reformism and Arab nationalism.
It established Arabic-medium schools, using textbooks from Egypt. The Jamiat Chair henceforth remained irmly in the hands of the sayyid faction. Persis an abbreviation of Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union was established in by a group of reformist-minded Sumatrans living in the West Javanese city of Bandung, with a modest self-educated man of Indian descent, A.
Hassan, as the leading religious thinker. Bandung has remained the centre of this organization, with its irst major educational institution, a modernist pesantren. A secondary centre emerged later in 02 CDII. He established another religious school there and began publishing the inluential journal Al-Muslimun, which found an audience well beyond the membership of Persis. Though a small organization, it has been quite inluential, because its leading thinkers were highly respected by other reformists.
Its most famous, and most inluential, member was Mohamad Natsir, who in the struggle for independence joined the Masyumi party and became its most prominent leader. Established in as an association of indigenous traders to protect common interests against Chinese competition, it very soon turned into a Muslim nationalist association that drew its following from a broad cross-section of the indigenous population. The PSII had a lasting inluence on the social and political agendas of other movements.
It lost its dramatic impact in the s but survived into Independence, until it was forced to merge with the other Muslim parties into the PPP in The abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in and the conquest of Mecca by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in the same year were important triggers: There were serious concerns that such purges of traditional Islamic practices as well as the traditional pesantren curriculum might also occur in Indonesia.
The establishment of a formal association was in itself a modern response, which did not at all come naturally to traditional Muslims, because of its association with the non-Muslim colonizing power. It involved drawing up by-laws in accordance with Dutch legislation, which had to be signed in front of a notary public. The founders of the NU were religious scholars and traders many in fact combined those roles , and the association has from the beginning been closely associated with the traditional religious schools pesantren and the charismatic teachers kiai ruling these institutions.
The NU deines its religious identity by the core elements of the traditional pesantren curriculum: Whereas the latter organization controls its own modern schools, NU has no equivalent authority over the pesantren, which belong to individual kiai. The NU was originally established as an association of kiai, and when it developed into an organization with a mass following, the kiai remained a special elite within the organization.
This is relected in the structure of the board, in which at all levels the executive named Tanidziyah is at least nominally subordinate to a religious council named Syuriah , of which only kiai are members. Major policy decisions were taken at congresses, at which the kiai retained a disproportionate inluence, even when they were far outnumbered by other members. After Indonesia had gained independence, the NU was transformed into a political party. In the parliamentary elections, it ended up as the third largest party, with A decade later, at its congress, the NU decided to withdraw completely from party politics, to sever its special relationship with the PPP, and not to allow members to hold simultaneously positions in the NU and a political party.
Soon after the fall of the Soeharto regime, it was Abdurrahman Wahid himself who established a political party that he intended to be the political vehicle of the NU and his own ambitions, the PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Party of National Awakening. The formal separation between the NU and political parties has remained, however. The NU is a truly national organization, with active branches in all provinces including even Papua , but it is signiicantly stronger in some provinces than in others.
Its true heartland is still East Java, and Central Java comes second. It was established by teachers of traditional Islamic schools surau and madrasah, corresponding to the Javanese pesantren.
The Minangkabau have migrated all over the Archipelago, and one inds branches of Perti wherever there are signiicant Minangkabau communities.
In matters of religious orthodoxy, Perti is perhaps even more conservative than NU. At Independence, Perti declared itself a political party it was the irst group to leave the umbrella organization Masyumi. For this reason, the organization had some dificulties in the early Soeharto period. When all Muslim parties were ordered to merge into the PPP, one faction of Perti did so; another faction decided to join Golkar instead, in which it remained a distinct component under the name of Tarbiyah Islamiyah.
Three other traditionalist regional associations deserve mention: These associations introduced reforms in the method of education but remained traditionalist in terms of doctrine and ritual. The traditionalist association Perti also had a distinct following in Aceh, but this appeared to be restricted to regions with a strong Minangkabau inluence. On the one hand, traditionalists have come to adopt much of the discourse of earlier generations of reformists; on the other, reformist associations such as the Muhammadiyah have lost some of their modernist and innovating character and become more conservative.
In the s and s, there was arguably more intellectual ferment in the NU, more critical relection on the tradition, than there was relection on reform in the Muhammadiyah. More importantly, there were new intellectual trends that could not be assigned to the reformist or the traditionalist mainstreams but appeared to transcend both. The most signiicant of these, during the s and s, was the movement for renewal of Islamic thought, of which former student leader Nurcholish Madjid was the main protagonist and to which Abdurrahman Wahid later came to make major contributions.
This movement took inspiration from early twentieth-century modernism but was critical of established Indonesian reformism as well as conservative traditionalist thought, and it showed great appreciation of intellectual dimensions of the Islamic tradition that had been rejected by earlier modernists. This movement will be discussed below, in the section focusing on Muslim intellectuals. University campuses were also the breeding ground for an entirely new type of Islamic movement, organized as semi-clandestine Islamic study groups in the s and s, and emerging in public after the fall of the Soeharto regime as the Indonesian chapters of transnational Islamic movements.
A movement that was slightly different in character, and notably less organized, was the Salafi movement. These three movements have, in different ways, become major challenges for the NU and Muhammadiyah. They have made signiicant inroads among the constituency of these large associations and have challenged their control over mosques, schools and other institutions.
The Muhammadiyah and NU are national organizations, in the sense of being organized nationwide but also of having been part of the movement for national independence and being dedicated to the idea of Indonesia as a nation. The Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Salai movement reject the very idea of the nation as a legitimate entity. They follow authorities who are based outside Indonesia.
The Tarbiyah movement also owed allegiance to authorities based in the Middle East; the PKS may now take its strategic decisions itself, but it regularly communicates with other national chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Its members were drawn from the various Muslim organizations to represent the entire range of mainstream views, but they were government-appointed and not answerable to their organizations. After the demise of the New Order, the MUI attempted to transform itself from a semi-governmental to a civil society organization, with regular congresses at which leaders are elected and broad policies discussed. It moreover co-opted representatives of various strands of political Islam, that had been beyond the pale during the Soeharto period.
MuslIM PolItIcal PartIes After a period during which all legal Muslim political representation had been reduced to a single political party that was not even overtly Islamic, the United Development Party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP , the fall of the Soeharto regime enabled the emergence of various new parties that appealed speciically to segments of the Muslim electorate.
To some extent, the situation of the s reminded of the political landscape of the period of liberal democracy in the s, although there were also some entirely new phenomena, most signiicantly the Islamist party PKS with its highly trained cadres and explicitly Islamist ideology.
Masyumi and NU, which polled 21 and The Darul Islam persisted as an underground movement throughout the Soeharto period and resurfaced in various forms in the s. Masyumi The Masyumi party owed its existence to the Japanese occupying forces, which made an effort to bring all Muslim groups and associations together in a single anti-imperialist front of that name.
In the early s, the traditionalist associations Perti and NU broke away from Masyumi to become political parties in their own right. From then on, Masyumi was more strongly associated with reformist Islam, although some traditionalist groups preferred to remain politically afiliated with Masyumi.
It was precisely over these issues that the party repeatedly clashed with Sukarno. Both parties were formally dissolved in and could never be oficially resuscitated. Soeharto never trusted the leading Masyumi politicians, however; the party remained banned, and he made sure its leaders played no part in any new political formation. The most prominent leaders, 02 CDII. Some middle-ranking Masyumi politicians were allowed to continue playing a part in politics under the New Order.
Others decided to join the government political machine, Golkar. The PBB appealed to those who remained most loyal to the Masyumi heritage; it performed very poorly in the elections, however, obtaining 1. It surprised itself by its success in the elections, and had to recruit competent persons outside its own circles to be able to ill all seats in parliament it had gained.
It lost this control in the irst New Order government and never regained it during the New Order. In 02 CDII. Individual members were free to be active in any political party of their choice but could not hold functions in a party as well as the NU organization. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan PPP The United Development Party, PPP, established by heavy-handed intervention of the New Order regime, was nonetheless the closest thing to an established opposition party and the military went to great length to weaken its performance in elections.
PPP had a limited political agenda but fought for what it considered core Muslim interests: After the demise of the New Order, many members left PPP and joined one or the other of the new Islamic parties, but the party has, in spite of internal conlicts, managed to maintain a core of loyal supporters.
In it still obtained The PKB explicitly does not wish to be an Islamic party but one that represents the entire nation — but its personnel is almost exclusively of NU background. The party has been split over rivalries between Abdurrahman Wahid and various former allies, and rapidly declined in popularity, from The PKB is not the only party claiming to represent the NU constituency, although deinitely the largest one.
Because Amien was the chairman of Muhammadiyah until he resigned to lead this new party, PAN is often seen as a Muhammadiyah- afiliated party, but in fact it represented from the beginning a rainbow coalition also including non-Muslims, like the informal action committee from which it emerged, the Majelis Amanat Rakyat MARA.
The PAN does not have an Islamic programme, though in the course of the years its social base gradually narrowed to a largely Muslim constituency. The latest addition to the Muslim party landscape is the Sun of the Nation Party Partai Matahari Bangsa , established in by young men with a Muhammadiyah background including former chairmen of Pemuda Muhammadiyah and Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah. Their aim was to create a political vehicle more representative of Muhammadiyah than PAN.
The Muhammadiyah board, however, has refused to recognize any speciic connection between this party and the Muhammadiyah, and insists that the Muhammadiyah is non-political and does not endorse any party. Along with the PAN, the PK was the party with the most sophisticated party programme and most transparent structure among those contesting the irst post-Soeharto elections.
It won 1. Encouraged by this success, the leadership targeted even more signiicant growth during the following period, apparently at the expense of its former standards of admission of members and the quality of cadre training. Women are conspicuously active in the party; in the elections, it ielded a larger proportion of women candidates than most other parties. It appealed especially to those sections of the educated middle class that were ideologically committed to political Islam, but more generally to all those who were disaffected with the corruption and ineficacy rampant in other parties.
The party has organized effective social welfare and disaster relief activities, which have won it much goodwill. The rapid growth has stalled, however. In the elections it obtained 7. The Darul Islam movement emerged in the independence struggle from resistance groups in West Java that rejected concessions made to the Dutch by the Republican government.
The leader and chief ideologist of the Darul Islam, S. Kartosoewirjo, had been an active member of the Sarekat Islam and a leading Masyumi politician in the early years of the Independence struggle, before he proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia. Similar movements in South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar and Aceh led by Daud Beureueh joined the West Java-based movement when they were frustrated with the central government. This was a political alliance; in terms of religious views the movements were rather different from one another.
The rank and ile of the West Javanese DI, on the other hand, were largely traditionalist Muslims which in the mids was to be the reason of a split in the underground movements.
After that date, it survived as an underground movement, partly controlled and manipulated by intelligence operatives, and occasionally coming into the limelight with a series of terrorist actions.
The movement appeared to be divided in a number of rival groups, of different degrees of sophistication. One of these groups, the regional network of the larger Jakarta region including the entire north coast of West Java , became later known as KW IX or Ninth Regional Command and was accused by other Islamic activists of being involved in robbery and a wide range of other criminal activities for fund-raising.
The alleged leader of this NII wing, Panji Gumilang, established a huge and lavishly furnished pesantren, named Al-Zaytun, that drew much attention for its spectacular architecture and the patronage it appeared to receive from powerful politicians during the late Soeharto years as well as in the post-Soeharto period.
They were the founders, among other things, of the reformist pesantren of Ngruki, after which their network was later sometimes named, and they were familiar with contemporary Middle Eastern Islamist thought. They appear to have joined NII in the s and infused the movement with new ideas and methods of cadre training derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. Around 02 CDII. JI was involved in a series of violent incidents in Indonesia and neighbouring countries; in fact, most of the terrorists of the s have been connected with JI or breakaway sections of it.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that NII has successfully recruited teenagers in various parts of Java, persuading them to leave their families and become full-time activists. Day-to-day affairs were run by a small executive board, based in Yogyakarta. It has a network stretching across the country and showed in August that it can mobilize at least , people. HTI also rejects liberal democracy and boycotts elections, and it aggressively proselytizes, especially in NU circles.
Its ultimate aim is the establishment of a caliphate uniting the entire Muslim world but it has no clear strategy on how to achieve this objective. As long as there is not a Caliph to lead the jihad against the enemies of Islam, it rejects all political violence. The FPI made a name for itself with vigilante raids on nightclubs, bars and other dens of inequity. Rizieq Syihab studied religion in Saudi Arabia and has a public discourse inluenced by Salaism, but his organization is not taken seriously as a religious movement by most other committed Muslims.
Another movement that aggressively ights what it considers as deviant forms of Islam, and that is taken more seriously though not necessarily respected is the Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penelitian Islam LPPI, Institute for Islamic Studies and Investigations , led by Amin Djamaluddin. In it turned to street politics and joined the FPI in a physical attack on an Ahmadiyah compound in Parung, Bogor, where the Qadian Ahmadiyah was then having its annual national meeting.
PII networks are still strong, allegedly also in the armed forces and the bureaucracy. It was ideologically close to Masyumi but formally independent and therefore did not suffer when Masyumi was banned. Not all members of the organization accepted his ideas, however; others tended towards more conservative or Islamist viewpoints. Numerous HMI members made successful careers in the bureaucracy, in education, in business, or in politics.
After the elections, about half of all delegates, nicely distributed over all parties, were former HMI members. Diponegoro in Jakarta Karim From the s on, PMII branches lourished at general universities as well.
The most important of the campus-based student movements was the Tarbiyah movement. Inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Tarbiyah movement, which emerged in the course of the s, organized religious discussion and mental training sessions. The political party PK S was established by former Tarbiyah activists. Remaja Masjid and Pemuda Masjid were teenage and youth groups active in major non-university mosques.
Numerous later radicals as well as moderates share a history of activism in this network in the s or s.
The DDII kept the Masyumi network alive through various media ventures and had an ambitious programme of training preachers. Unlike most Central and East Javanese pesantren, these had remained loyal to Masyumi after the conlict that caused NU to leave the party. Al-Haidy and at least one of his co-workers had prior Darul Islam connections in Aceh, and in Jakarta they appear to have been connected to the underground NII.
Al-Haidy was arrested in the wake of the Tanjung Priok riots of and attracted wide attention nationally and internationally due to his fearless and outspoken criticism of New Order policies during his defence in the courtroom.
Like the latter, it provided preachers in the provinces with standardized sermons. The Muhammadiyah considers itself as an organization for dakwah ; but within the Muhammadiyah there is a special organization for predication, the Majelis Tabligh Council for Dissemination , which is considered as the most conservative body within the Muhammadiyah organization. This used to be one of the most conservative bodies within the NU, and the one that has had the most direct connections with Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World League.
Nurcholish Madjid was hailed as the innovative thinker, who distanced himself from stagnant Islamic politics of the Old Order period and looked forward instead, preaching a message of tolerance and pluralism. Dawam Rahardjo was the organizer, active in a series of NGOs; and several friends provided support in the background.
Together they were referred to as the Islamic Renewal pembaruan Islam or pembaruan pemikiran Islam movement. Fifteen years later , after Nurcholish Madjid had returned from Ph. In the s, Paramadina expanded its activities beyond the monthly seminar-style public lectures and debates in posh surroundings to include various courses and publications, in which the focus was increasingly on pluralism and respect for other religious traditions.
Most non-fundamentalist Muslim intellectuals of the period were at one time or another associated with LSAF. Some of its staff later joined Paramadina. In , Soeharto suddenly allowed the establishment of a formal association of Muslim intellectuals, to be headed by his trusted minister 02 CDII. Analysts differed on whether ICMI represented a strengthening of Muslim civil society and a genuine intellectual forum or was a ploy of Soeharto to co-opt some of his former critics at a moment when he was facing challenges from the armed forces.
As a counter move he established the Forum Demokrasi, in which he cooperated with intellectuals of various mostly Christian backgrounds. ICMI survived into the post-Soeharto period but has become insigniicant.
In the post-Soeharto years, Paramadina retained a highly visible presence, contributing to debates on the re-interpretation of received Islamic teachings. The most remarkable newcomer on the scene, however, was Jaringan Islam Liberal JIL, Liberal Islam Network , which received appropriately liberal funding from The Asia Foundation until it ran into too much opposition from conservative Muslim circles.
JIL is in many respects the successor to the pembaruan Islam movement, but it lacks the protection that Nurcholish Madjid and his colleagues enjoyed from the New Order regime.
LKiS has consistently positioned itself as more left-wing and committed to social and economic justice, whereas JIL embraced economic liberalism. Both institutes aim to keep the ideas of their founders alive and offer a protective umbrella to younger activists. Only a small proportion of these NGOs has an explicitly Islamic identity or character. Unlike LP3ES, LSP had a single leader, Adi Sasono, who had a strong Masyumi background and appeared to represent more left-leaning views of development and more explicit criticism of the role of the military.
Towards the middle of the decade, Sasono and Rahardjo teamed up with Abdurrahman Wahid, scion of the most prominent NU family, for a programme of community development projects to be carried out in and around pesantren, the traditional Islamic boarding schools.
The three men were to play parts in numerous later NGO ventures.
Because neither Sasono nor Rahardjo, with their urban Masyumi backgrounds, had easy access in the pesantren world, they needed the cooperation of Abdurrahman Wahid, and through the latter recruited a number of other young men of NU background, who were trained in the management of development programmes. These men there were no women activists among them as yet later laid the foundations of NGO activism in NU circles.
The director was, and remains until today, Masdar F. Other sponsors proposed different programmes, and P3M, like many other NGOs, has always had to ind a balance between its own ideals and the changing global NGO agenda as mediated by such sponsors as the Ford Foundation. In the early s, activists who had previously worked with P3M established a separate NGO exclusively focusing on gender-related issues, named Rahima. Just like P3M, Rahima has both Masyumi- and NU-afiliated activists; however, it focuses less speciically on the pesantren world.
Several other NGOs that were closer to the pesantren world followed suit: At the NU Congress, Abdurrahman Wahid was chosen to lead the organization, and a number of other men with experience in NGO work also took up leading positions. To this end, the NU established its own NGO, called Lakpesdam Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources , that was to carry out a wide range of developmental and educational activities in segments of society where NU was strongly represented.
Lakpesdam was based in the capital and active nationally; at the provincial level, similar NGOs with similar programmes were established. Quite a few active Fatayat members were previously or concurrently involved in Rahima, Lakpesdam or other NGOs; Fatayat provided one of the main channels through which Muslim feminist ideas reached the grassroots.
Through its own publishing house, LKiS introduced many new and thought-provoking authors to the Indonesian public. A programme of human rights training it carried out among pesantren youth throughout the country in the s gave this NGO the reputation of being the most progressive Muslim institution. Each represents a speciic strain within the progressive discourse often associated with Abdurrahman Wahid. It has organized numerous seminars and introduced many liberal-minded foreign Muslim thinkers to the Indonesian public.
It is somewhat surprising that there are no serious Muhammadiyah-based counterparts to these NU-based progressive NGOs. JIMM, discussed above among the Muslim intellectual associations, comes closest to them, but its range of activities is very limited. Since the end of the New Order, Dompet Dhuafa has been collecting charitable gifts zakat and sadaqa from the general public, with which it has supported various projects involving productive activities in needy communities. Rumah Zakat emerged out of a similar initiative by persons close to the Tarbiyah movement.
It runs an impressive nationwide network of centres offering various services to the poor, including maternity clinics, and has also been active in relief aid to disaster-stricken regions. It sent relief goods but allegedly also ighters Afghanistan veterans to support the Muslim communities in the conlict zones. Although no heterodox teachings could be pinpointed, the movement aroused suspicion among the mainstream for their refusal to pray together with other Muslims.
It was repeatedly declared a deviant sect by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia but enjoyed the protection of powerful Golkar personalities. In an effort to become less conspicuous, it changed its name several times: It claims tens of thousands of adherents Zulkili , Tablighis are apolitical and attempt to model their lives on that of the Prophet.
Members are expected to regularly take part in missionary tours 02 CDII. This may cause confusion with two other movements whose members adopt similar though not identical dress codes, the Darul Arqam and the Salai movement. In the s it spread to Indonesia as well as Singapore and Southern Thailand.
The movement stresses a combination of active participation in society and a lifestyle emulating the life of the Prophet. Many of its members are professionals. Core followers lived in a utopian community in the village of Sungai Penchala. In Indonesia, a similar community was established in Depok. The movement was characterized by strong millenarian expectations; Ashaari Muhammad several times announced the end of the world. In Indonesia, Darul Arqam has not suffered similar suppression.
The Indonesian branch also uses the name Rufaqa; it has made sure not to appear too exclusive and has moved closer to the mainstream. In the early s, a handful of Indonesians who had studied Islam in Saudi Arabia, under Saudi and Yemeni teachers, began spreading the puritan Salai message in Indonesia, through study circles targeting students and a few madrasah offering basic Islamic education to children.
In , he transformed this organization, with covert military support, into the Laskar Jihad, which took part in inter-religious conlicts in the Moluccas and elsewhere. The Abu Nida group has always stayed aloof from politics Hasan , In spite of differences among them, both groups follow quietist Salai teachers in the Arabian peninsula. Independent of these two Javanese groups, the movement Wahdah Islamiyah Islamic Unity in South Sulawesi is also of Salai inspiration, at least in its theology.
They have no connections with the more strictly Salai groups. These various groups have very little in common with the quietist Salais. Besides, there are also a number of Sui orders of local origin and doubtful in the eyes of non-members orthodoxy, and various syncretistic mystical movements aliran kebatinan. The irst such umbrella organization was the Partai Politik Tharikat Islam PPTI , originally a local West Sumatran association of Naqshbandi teachers, led by the politically astute Haji Jalaluddin, which during the s developed into a nationwide association in which teachers of various other orders also took part.
This order, known by the acronym TQN Thariqah Qadiriyah wan Naqsyabandiyah has established a dense network of local branches all over Indonesia as well as in neighbouring Singapore and Malaysia. In Indonesia the terms have been commonly used to refer to a much broader range of reformist movements, including 02 CDII.
Pijper wrote a very perceptive study, with sympathetic portraits of leading reformists whom the author knew personally as modern and reasonable men. Peacock a, b emphasizes the puritanical dimension, and Atjeh focuses on the effort to return to the pure Islam of the irst generations of believers the Salaf.
Burhani , Nakamura ; on the Sumatran reformist style and Muhammadiyah: Hamka The incumbent minister, Prof.
Muhammad Nuh, is closer to the NU. Pijper gives a sympathetic portrait of A. See also Anshari and Mughni Recognition of the other three schools allows in theory for greater lexibility. On the origins of Masyumi, see Benda , pp. On the debates, see Boland Dijk and Dengel Formichi provides an interesting additional perspective on the basis of interviews with current sympathizers.
Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt: Shifting Worlds. RoutledgeCurzon, Abduh, Umar. Abdul Syukur. Gerakan Usroh di Indonesia: Peristiwa Lampung Ombak, Anshari, H. Endang Saifuddin and Syaiq A. Wajah dan Wijhah Seorang Mujtahid. Atjeh, H. Muhji Atsaris Salaf. Gerakan Salaijah di Indonesia. Permata, Barton, Greg. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 8, no. Barton, Greg and Fealy Greg, eds. Clayton, VIC: Monash Asia Institute, Benda, Harry J. The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation — The Hague: The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia.
Martinus Nijhoff, LKiS, South East Asia Research 10, no. Tauris, a. Encyclopaedia of Islam. In The Madrasa in Asia: Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen. Bruinessen, Martin van and Farid Wajidi. Burhani, Ahmad Najib. Studia Islamika 12, no. Chiou, Syuan Yuan. Utrecht University, Dengel, Holk H. Franz Steiner Verlag, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia.
Elson, Robert E. Studia Islamika 16, no. Federspiel, Howard M. Indonesia 10 Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: Les Pionniers de la Tradition. The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism.
Islam and the Making of the Nation: Furkon, Aay Muhamad. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Teraju, Muhammadiyah di Minangkabau.
Yayasan Nurul Islam, International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. International Crisis Group, Kadir, Suzaina. Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis. Zed Books, Karim, M. Mizan, Kull, Ann. Piety and Politics: Department of Anthropology and History of Religions, Ayahnya kemudian menikahi Nourma Yunita. Pernikahannya dengan Ferry Iskandar berakhir perceraian. Dari pernikahan ini lahir seorang anak bernama Maghali Inala Netar. Ferry sendiri meragukan bahwa Maghali adalah hasil dari pernikahan mereka.
Soal anaknya, Andhara menyatakan bahwa biar hanya dia saja yang mengetahui. Ia pernah dikaitkan memiliki hubungan dekat dengan Ariel yang seorang vokalis grup musik Peterpan.
Andhara Early kemudian menikah dengan Cesa David Luckmansyah. Setelah hampir setahun berpacaran, ia menikah dengan Cesa yang pertama kali diperkenalkan kepada wartawan infotainment saat menemaninya merayakan ulang tahun pertama anaknya pada 29 Juli Pernikahannya dengan Cesa dilakukan pada 28 Januari pada pukul Ibu kandung dan ibu tirinya menyerahkan maskawin berupa seperangkat alat salat, satu set perhiasan emas permata, dan uang senilai Rp2.
Resepsi pernikahan yang ketiga dari Andhara Early dan pernikahan yang pertama dengan Bugi Ramadhana, anggota grup musik Phantom dilangsungkan pada tanggal 11 September Dari Wikipedia bahasa Indonesia, ensiklopedia bebas. Ini adalah versi stabil , diperiksa pada tanggal 18 Agustus Ada 4 perubahan tertunda menunggu peninjauan.